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The ethical dimension of dialogue represents a major concern in the context of current research in 
intercultural responsibility. In this paper, I discuss the modalities in which the notion of competence 
is used to conceptualise responsibility and the relationship between self and other in intercultural 
research, in order to critique the Cartesian presuppositions of intercultural communication theory. I 
argue that models of competence and responsibility that are employed to design intercultural 
training operate within the paradigm of the autonomous rational agent that informs Kantian ethical 
thinking. I contrast the model of the competent intercultural speaker that emerges in intercultural 
research with the distinction proposed by Levinas between the saying and the said (le dire and le dit, 
meaning the event of speech and the content of speech), to suggest two scenarios of intercultural 
interaction that show two different approaches to responsibility, one operating in the dimension of 
the said and the other in the dimension of the saying. Thus, in this paper, I discuss the implications 
of Levinas’s reflection on the nature of language for the development of an ethical framework that 
addresses the limitations of current conceptualisations in intercultural communication theory of 
competence and responsibility. 
La dimensione etica del dialogo rappresenta una delle preoccupazioni maggiori nell’ambito della 
ricerca sulla responsabilità interculturale. In questo articolo analizzo in maniera critica le modalità in 
cui la nozione di competenza è usata per concettualizzare il concetto di responsabilitá e la relazione 
con l’altro nel contesto della teoria della comunicazione interculturale, in modo da discuterne le 
presupposizioni Cartesiane. I modelli di competenza e responsabilità che sono utilizzati nel training 
interculturale operano all’interno del paradigma dell’agente autonomo razionale della tradizione 
etica kantiana. Ho intenzione di contrastare il modello del “competent intercultural speaker” che 
emerge dalla ricerca interculturale con la distinzione creata da Levinas tra il dire e il detto (le dire e 
le dit, l’evento della parola e il contenuto della lingua), per suggerire due scenari di interazione 
interculturale che mostrano due approcci alla responsabilitá, uno nella dimensione del dire e l’altro 
nella dimensione del detto. Quindi, in questo articolo discuto le implicazioni delle riflessioni di 
Levinas sulla natura del linguaggio per lo sviluppo di una comprensione etica che riconosce i limiti 
delle concettualizzazioni delle nozioni di competenza e responsabilità nella teoria della 
comunicazione interculturale. Keywords: ethical communication; responsibility; Levinas; 
intercultural competences; language learning. 
Introduction  
This paper is theoretical and exploratory in nature. Its aim is twofold: to describe the models of 
competence developed in the field of intercultural communication, and to introduce the categories 
of the said, meaning the content of speech, and the saying, which indicates the event of speech, 
elaborated by Levinas (1998). Using this distinction, I discuss the modalities in which the notion of 
competence is used to conceptualise responsibility and the relationship between self and other in 
intercultural research, and I suggest two scenarios of intercultural interaction, one operating in the 
dimension of the said and the other in the dimension of the saying. In doing this, I describe the 
ethical relation formulated by Levinas (1969, 1985, 1998, 2006) to define the encounter with the 
uniqueness of the other through the open-ended character of dialogue, in order to critique the 
Cartesian presuppositions of intercultural communication (henceforth IC) theory. My contention is 
that models of competence and responsibility that are employed to design intercultural training (e.g. 
Deardorff, 2006, 2009; Guilherme, Keating, & Hoppe, 2010; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004; Spencer-
Oatey & Stadler, 2009) reflect the Kantian notion of the rational autonomy of the moral agent who is 
held accountable for the effect of his/her moral decisions on others, who become the recipients of 
his/her actions. The locus of this agency is the Cartesian subject of the ‘I think’, a bounded individual 
capable of autonomy and rationality, a concept that developed during the Enlightenment, and 
particularly through Kantian moral philosophy, with the internalisation of reason and judgement in 
the thinking subject according to universal norms of freedom and equality. In other words, the 
subject of this form of rationality that initiated the modern conception of ethical thinking is able to 
choose the right course of action according to what reason dictates (Furrow, 2005; Popke, 2003). My 
argument develops as follows: in the first section, I begin with a reflection on the origins of 
interculturalism as a field of inquiry in North American foreign policy and trade, which informs a 
functionalist understanding of communicative competence as effective transmission of meaning 
across cultures (Martin & Nakayama, 2010). After touching upon critical formulations of intercultural 
competence in the context of language learning, I outline current research on the acquisition of 
communicative competences relating to the development of intercultural responsibility. Finally, I 
trace the connection that is established in intercultural research between the acquisition of 
communicative competences and the development of responsibility to the idea of the autonomous 
rational agent that informs Kantian ethical thinking. In contrast to the model of the competent 
intercultural speaker that emerges in intercultural research, I intend to discuss the implications of 
Levinas’s reflection on the nature of language for the development of an ethical framework that 
addresses the limitations of current conceptualisations in intercultural communication theory of 
competence and responsibility. 
The field of intercultural research  
The origins of IC as a field of inquiry in North American foreign policy and trade inform the idea of 
communication as effective transmission of meaning across cultures. The genealogical 
reconstruction of the field of IC conducted by Moon (2010) attributes the narrow understanding of 
culture in terms of national boundaries and the preference for microanalysis focused on 
communicative practices between interactants from different national cultures, to the agenda set by 
the US Foreign Institute in the 1950s in order to create intercultural training to use in trade with 
foreign countries. Moon concludes that:  
Intercultural communication developed in the midst of World War II as a tool of imperialism and that 
much of its foundations were infused with a colonial perspective. (2010, p. 35) 
Moon attributes the formulation of the concepts of adaptation and competence to this dominant 
intercultural discourse that has narrowed the field of research to a set of categories that are based 
on the dichotomy self/cultural other. A significant consequence for intercultural studies is the 
development of competence training with its practical applications in a variety of contexts. In 
research conducted in this field (e.g. Berardo & Deardorff, 2012; Deardorff, 2006, 2009; Hammer, 
Bennett, & Wiseman, 2003; Hofstede, Pedersen, & Hofstede, 2002; Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009), 
the ideal of an intercultural performer who can apply the skills of intercultural training in a number 
of contexts, such as education, management, tourism and intercultural mediation, contributes to the 
creation of what can be defined as an intercultural industry. An illustration of this intercultural 
industry is represented by the research of Hofstede (2001) on cultural difference, which offers a 
model of training in intercultural contexts that reduces culture to a pattern of standardised models 
of behaviour. The principal claim is that knowledge of behavioural patterns pertinent to a culture, or 
a cluster of cultures, reduces stress, anxiety and miscommunication in intercultural encounters. A 
particular essentialist feature is the opposition between individualism and collectivism, the former 
considered a value characteristic of Western societies that nurtures initiative and critical thinking, 
whilst the latter promotes reliance on tradition and group cohesion typical of Eastern cultures. From 
a similar perspective, Hall (1995) delineates two main dimensions of culture: high/low assertiveness 
and high/low responsiveness, so that each style is seen as conforming to a specific national culture. 
Behind the neutrality of academic research, these values are ideologically attributed to a 
fundamental, yet unproven difference between freedom in Western societies and the sacrifice of 
the individual to cultural values in all other societies. According to Jack (2009) this form of 
interculture is hegemonic, in the sense that this partial and simplified understanding of culture has 
become a dominant paradigm, assuming the posture of scientific truth. The idea of cultural 
differences in communication is thus used in guiding communicative exchanges in elite situations, 
such as business and management, in which recognition of the other is essentialised. Martin and 
Nakayama (2010) describe hegemonic interculturalism within a functionalist paradigm deriving from 
post-positivist social psychological research (e.g. Barnett & Lee, 2002; Gudykunst, 2003), that 
focuses on consciousness and on the competences of the intercultural speaker in terms of 
acquisition of skills, effectiveness and appropriateness in language use. In this context, Wiseman’s 
definition of intercultural competence is illustrative of the functionalist paradigm: 
ICC competence involves the knowledge, motivation and skills to interact effectively and 
appropriately with members of different cultures. (2003, p. 192) 
This ability is further described as the process of identifying “meanings, rules and codes for 
interacting appropriately” (p. 200). According to Wiseman, this epistemological approach to 
competence is accompanied by another ontological dimension that foregrounds the dialectical 
process of negotiation of separate cultural identities in the course of interaction. In this sense, 
epistemological factors, including awareness of the other culture, self-awareness and knowledge of 
the language of interaction, contribute to the successful negotiation of cultural identities that results 
in competent and effective communication. For example, in Deardoff’s model of competence (2006, 
2009), the goal of intercultural communication is to communicate effectively and appropriately, 
showing adaptability and flexibility in selecting appropriate and effective styles that are 
culturespecific, reflecting the culture of the other relative to the context of interaction. Blommaert 
(1991, 1998) highlights this preoccupation with the practical applications of IC to education, training 
and management, which leaves unproblematised the notion of culture and the power dimension at 
work in intercultural communicative exchanges. Similarly, Scollon and Scollon (1995), and Piller 
(2011) claim that the influence of culture is often inflated in determining behaviour and 
communication, hiding the socioeconomic inequality that underlies the urban, multicultural and 
multilingual contexts in which much intercultural communication takes place. From this perspective, 
Roy and Starosta (2001) argue that a positivist and scientist approach is counter-productive when 
applied to human sciences, particularly intercultural communication, because it essentialises cultural 
identity, whilst ignoring the political, social and economic factors that determine the context of 
interaction. Furthermore, Curtin (2010) positions intercultural competences within the broader 
ideological and structural contexts in which they are “enacted, judged and challenged” (p. 279), thus 
problematising competence intended in terms of performance, effectiveness and appropriateness. 
From a similar critical perspective, Cheng (2010) and DeTurk (2010) problematise the focus on 
competence training in order to facilitate intergroup dialogue as the process of reinforcing dominant 
discourses. An illustrative example of this form of essentialism is the intercultural project Global 
People, which provides guidance in developing intercultural awareness and competence in 
international educational contexts. In the competency framework delineated by Spencer-Oatey and 
Stadler (2009), the formulation of competence in terms of acquisition of effective and appropriate 
communicative skills recalls the neo-essentialism that Holliday (2011) ascribes to the use of language 
of scientific neutrality in relation to culture and communication. In this excerpt, the acquisition of 
effective and appropriate communicative skills is presented as an essential pre-requisite in building 
trust and mutual understanding in international exchanges: 
One of the key resources we bring to building trust and mutual understanding with our international 
partners is the quality of our communication skills. We may have come to some useful initial 
conclusions about what they want and how they operate, but unless we can build on this through 
effective and appropriate communication strategies and skills, the potential for building shared 
meaning will be lost. Often international partnerships can be beset by misunderstandings based on 
problems in overcoming the language barrier as well as a failure to draw on the right mix of listening, 
speaking and perceptiveness skills in order to construct, explore and negotiate meaning. Often 
people underestimate the amount of background information that is required to be shared up-front 
to create a platform for mutual understanding, as well as the different styles needed for 
communicating effectively with their international partners. (Spencer-Oatey & Stadler, 2009, p. 5) 
This model of competence is built on previous knowledge of communicative styles and behavioural 
patterns in order to direct the ability to frame interlocutors within a national tradition. What 
transpires from these formulations of communicative competence is the possibility to achieve a 
form of transparent communication once the cultural other has been identified and categorised, 
marginalising the crucial task of intercultural studies to highlight the processual character of 
communication as an activity that is always situated and negotiated between speakers in both 
intercultural and intracultural situations (Dervin, 2011). Phipps (2007, 2010) critiques the idea of the 
acquisition of intercultural competence as a quick fix to resolving conflict and misunderstanding, and 
the practices of the intercultural industry, or “consciousness raising industry” (Phipps, 2013, p. 10), 
in directing intercultural communication research towards the production of training courses and 
manuals that offer practical applications and ready-made solutions to the complex endeavour of 
human understanding. Instead, Phipps emphasises the complexity of communication and ‘the mess 
of human relatedness in languages’ (2007, p. 26). In this context, the emergence of theoretical 
interventions that challenge the divide self/other along cultural lines signals the movement towards 
a redefinition of intercultural communication beyond current models of acquisition, assessment and 
reliable testing of communicative competences. The post-structuralist approach of Monceri (2003, 
2009) rejects culture as the principal model to understand and explain behaviour, emphasising flux 
and becoming over cultural categorisation. Similarly, Dervin (2010, 2011) employs the concept 
of’space-time’ instead of the word culture, in reference to Bauman’s(2000) liquid modernity, 
meaning that culture is always situated, and as such, it is a joint construction between self and other 
shaped by the context of interaction. 
The competence model in critical intercultural language pedagogy Byram (2008) addresses critically 
the priority accorded to the teaching of English over other languages, which drives formulations of 
communicative competence in terms of the hegemonic interculturalism outlined in the previous 
section. In his words, learning a foreign language is now almost synonymous with learning English: 
The role of English thus often dominates the development of language education policies and the 
teaching of English has been a major influence on the methods of teaching all foreign languages. 
(Byram, 2008, p. 9) 
Furthermore, the prevalent version of English used in international exchanges is Business English, 
considered a lingua franca in intercultural business communication (Jack, 2009; Louhiala-Salminen, 
Charles, & Kankaanranta, 2005). From this perspective, Hüllen (2006) contrasts the utilitarian 
motivation for learning English as a foreign language to intercultural language learning, outlining a 
notion of competence that takes into account the socially constructed nature of culture and the 
context of interaction. This latter understanding of competence is illustrated by Byram’s model of 
Savoirs (Byram & Zarate, 1997a, 1997b), which was influential in the development of the common 
European Framework of Reference for Languages (Council of Europe, 2001). In this model, the 
intercultural speaker acquires communicative competence not by casting off his or her social 
identity in the pursuit of a model of native speaker competence, but by developing the ability to 
assess the relationship between cultures and mediate between them. This is particularly evident in 
the case of non-native speakers communicating through a third language, or lingua franca, which 
increases complexity in communication (Byram & Risager, 1999). Similarly, Phipps and Gonzalez 
(2004) introduce the notion of languaging to highlight the complex nature of culture and the role of 
language in shaping social environments. According to the authors, the intercultural skill of 
languaging enables negotiation, understanding and transformation in the figure of the languagers-in-
action, intercultural beings that cross borders and engage reflectively with self and other. Guilherme 
(2010) also draws on the notion of situatedness, recognising the necessity to develop a form of 
competence appropriated to context in order to facilitate communication and understanding in 
multicultural settings. However, despite the transnational paradigm of Risager (2006), the 
redefinition of intercultural competence and language learning in terms of critical intercultural 
citizenship (Byram, 2008; Guilherme, 2002), and the notion of languaging (Phipps & Gonzalez, 2004), 
I agree with Dervin (2010) that critical models of intercultural competence are far from becoming 
embedded in the practice of language teaching. Indeed, learning a foreign language still rests on the 
idealised notion of the nation state, built on the ideal of a common language and of a native speaker 
reflecting a homogeneous national culture opposed to other national identities (see the notion of 
imagined communities in Anderson, 1991; the unproblematic use of the word ‘foreign’ in language 
teaching and learning in Pavlenko, 2003; and the description of the national paradigm in language 
and culture pedagogy in Risager, 2008). The origins of this national paradigm in German 
Romanticism in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries is a well-rehearsed argument 
(e.g. Hardcastle, 1999; Risager, 2006); therefore, I will only mention von Humboldt’s(1988) and 
Herder’s conceptualisation of language as connecting individual consciousness to the wider cultural 
and spiritual life of a nation, promoting the educational value of the ability to establish comparisons 
between different peoples and cultures, both past and present, through the study of other 
languages. This ability formed an important part in von Humboldt’s educational ideal of Bildung as 
personal and cultural maturation, based on the Kantian presupposition of the value of moral 
qualities in the development of the individual, and it is powerful to this day in shaping national 
educational policies (Hardcastle, 1999). Kramsch (2009) addresses critically both national cultural 
paradigms and the understanding of communication as information exchange with the idea of 
symbolic competence. In this model of competence, the reality of computer-mediated 
communication and the simultaneous coexistence of different languages and other signifying 
practices in everyday life displace traditional spatial/temporal positioning. These signifying practices 
are referred not only in terms of different linguistic codes, but include all the semiotic resources that 
contribute to the making of a hybrid identity and allow multilingual speakers to appropriate and 
manipulate multiple symbolic systems. This symbolic entity is formed in interaction with the 
environment through the discursive practices of others, which are then re-appropriated through the 
conscious activity of interpretation of signs and symbolic forms and the unconscious activity 
mediated by the conative sphere involving emotions, feelings, memories and desires. Kramsch 
attributes the construction of the self to this complex process of interaction: 
We only learn who we are through the mirror of others, and, in turn, we only understand others by 
understanding ourselves as Other. (2009, p. 18) 
In other words, according to Kramsch, the process of acquiring symbolic competence entails a 
decentering of the self. I adopt this idea of decentering of the self to suggest that research on 
competence described in reference to Deardorff (2006, 2009), Hofstede (2001), Spencer-Oatey and 
Stadler (2009) and Wiseman (2003), as well as the model of responsibility delineated in Guilherme et 
al. (2010) which I describe in the next section draw on the philosophical tradition of the autonomy of 
the individual. Thus, the relationship self/other is posited in terms of tolerance, leaving open the 
question of critical engagement and dialogue with differing ethical frameworks in intercultural 
encounters. 
Communicative competence and intercultural responsibility  
Guilherme et al. (2010) describe intercultural responsibility in terms of “a dimension that aims to go 
beyond a straightforward notion of intercultural competence” (p. 79). Whereas intercultural 
competence provides the tools to communicate “appropriately and effectively across cultures” 
(Guilherme et al., 2010), responsibility adds an ethical layer to intercultural interaction. According to 
the authors, if communicative competence prevents conflict and misunderstanding due to a lack of 
cultural awareness, intercultural responsibility introduces respect of the other culture and of a 
different ethical framework. In their words, responsibility also contains an emancipatory aspect that 
develops from the exercise of intercultural ethics framed within the concept of global ethics, an 
approach that seeks to reconcile and balance universalistic and relativistic perspectives. This process 
happens through an ontological shift, a process of discovery and awareness that causes a change in 
being, transforming the individual into an “intercultural mobile being” (Guilherme, 2010) or 
an‘intercultural personhood’ (Kim Yun, 2008). As a result of this critical cycle that causes the 
ontological transformation, difference is not only perceived in the cultural other, but it is also 
recognised within intra-cultural contexts and within the individual. The final outcome of this 
epistemological and subsequent ontological shift is the development of responsibility, the ability to 
interact effectively and to respect the other culture and a different ethical framework, leading to the 
acquisition of tolerance, which Guilherme describes as “a psychological readiness to be empathetic 
and to control one’s emotions, that is, to be patient and tolerant towards the other” (2010, p. 8). In 
this description of responsibility, the intercultural personhood is able to forsake both particularistic 
ethical perspectives and a superficial, or even opportunistic, acknowledgement of difference for 
instrumental purposes in the name of intercultural dialogue. This is accompanied by the claim that a 
flexible approach to ethical dilemmas achieved through intercultural responsibility will balance 
relativistic and universalistic perspectives, leading to emancipatory citizenship and the 
“corresponding re-framing of institutions and organisations” (Guilherme, 2010, p. 81). The form of 
responsibility, advocated by Guilherme, Keating and Hoppe with particular reference to multicultural 
workplaces, demands that: 
Every member is responsible not only for identifying and recognising the cultural idiosyncrasies of 
every other member-in-interaction, but also for developing full and reciprocally demanding 
professional relationships with them. (2010, p. 79) 
In this context, the principal elements that allow the negotiation of conflicting and relativistic 
viewpoints, promoting intercultural responsibility, are represented by coherence, empathy and 
solidarity, described as the ability to work in a collaborative attitude to others and to adapt ethical 
principles to interactional contexts whilst maintaining ‘underlying moral principles’ (Guilherme et al., 
2010, p. 79). From this standpoint, an intercultural being is able to interact using effective 
communicative strategies that display a degree of intercultural competence in handling difference, 
shifting perspective, adopting the viewpoint of the other and negotiating differing values. As a 
consequence, intercultural communication aims to reduce uncertainty in communicative exchanges 
when difficulties in establishing dialogue are attributed to culture, with the resulting differences in 
styles of communication. In this regard, responsibility in communication is translated as the 
acquisition of intercultural competences in communicating with other speakers from different 
cultural backgrounds, negotiating between differing ethical frameworks. However, the emphasis 
placed on transformation and dialogue over the simple acquisition of competences is problematic, 
because the other is still identified with a foreign language and culture, and responsibility emerges 
as tolerance of the other. In this sense, this account of responsibility reflects Holliday’s(2011) 
description of neoessentialist intercultural research, characterised by the use of the category of 
cultural difference to analyse the dynamics underlying intercultural communication, initiating a 
process of othering, or the creation of the dichotomy between the self and the cultural other. This 
dichotomy is further illustrated in relation to the ethical tradition of autonomy in moral philosophy, 
which I delineate in the next section in contrast to Levinasian ethics. 
Kantian ethics and Levinasian ethics  
Kant (1979) defines ethics as a theory of virtue, based on the strength of self-mastery with respect to 
the moral disposition, and distinguishes between pure and practical reason, the former concerning 
knowledge and the latter the conduct of beings possessed of free will. Kantian ethics formulates 
morality in terms of autonomy and redefines the relationship between individuals and society in 
terms of self-governance of the individual (Atwell, 1986; Schneewind, 1998). A crucial aspect of 
Kantian autonomy is that, as part of the noumenal realm (i.e. the realm of the thing-in-itself, 
unknowable to human experience), freedom is intended in transcendental terms, which means that 
moral action is not the result of natural causation. On the contrary, moral action follows instead the 
categorical imperative, a categorical obligation not influenced by the pull of desires and 
interferences from the sensible world. Providing a comprehensive review of the subsequent 
developments of the role of autonomy and reason in moral philosophy falls outside the scope of this 
paper. To this end, I will describe two approaches to ethical thinking that are relevant in order to 
introduce Levinasian ethics: critical theory and the postmodern turn. The critique of the 
Enlightenment, started with Adorno and Horkheimer in the Frankfurt School, focused on the notion 
of the abstract transcendental subject, particularly the identification between instrumental reason 
and the ensuing understanding of human action as determined by utilitarian motives and the 
imperative of self-preservation: 
The self (which, according to the methodical extirpation of all natural residues because they are 
mythological, must no longer be either body or blood, or soul, or even the natural I), once 
sublimated into the transcendental or logical subject, would form the reference point of reason, of 
the determinative instance of action. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 29) 
The second generation of critical theory, starting with Habermas, rediscovered the Enlightenment 
project with a critique of instrumental reason and of the self-founding Cartesian subject, through an 
appreciation of the role of reason understood in the relation to its historical, social and embodied 
incarnations (Habermas, 1987; Jacobs, 2001). This project of revaluation, based on the notion of 
communicative ethics that Habermas envisaged in situated reason, is realised in the communicative 
practices of ordinary interactions oriented to mutual understanding (Habermas, 1987). The other 
approach to ethical thinking, the postmodern turn, highlighted the principal argument of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997), the role of reason in excluding the ‘other’ of thinking 
in the name of uniformity and sameness (Honneth, 1995). This attention towards the 
heterogeneous, the non-identical and the excluded from the self-transparency of the Cartesian Self 
represented the starting point of postmodern ethical thinking (Derrida, 2001; Lyotard, 1984, 1988; 
Poster, 1989). In this context, Honneth (1995) indicates the notion of asymmetrical obligation 
between people, developed by Derrida on the basis of Levinas, as the only real challenge to modern 
theories of morality in the Kantian tradition. Whereas postmodern attention towards the 
particularity of each individual person and their rights to articulate interests and claims recalls 
Habermas’ model of communicative action, asymmetrical obligation counters the Kantian 
perspective of equal treatment, initiating a unique model of postmodern ethics. The premise of this 
reversal of Kantian autonomy is that we become ethical beings only in accepting the obligation 
towards the other, which breaks the egocentrism of interest-oriented action of instrumental reason 
and the disembodied, abstract dictates of the Kantian categorical imperative. In Derrida, this 
obligation translates in the ideas of unlimited care and hospitality, and the notion of deferred justice 
(for an account of hospitality and deferred justice, see Derrida, 1992, 2000, 2001). In the ethical 
relation described by Levinas (1969, 1985, 1998, 2006), the relation to the other lived as pure 
exteriority is devoid of any form of intentionality, for the self previously enclosed in the solitude of 
egoism and selfpreservation is exposed to the other in an asymmetrical relation. Levinas writes that: 
The freedom of another could never begin in my freedom, that is, abide in the same present, be 
contemporary, be representable to me. The responsibility for the other cannot have begun in my 
commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the 
hither side of my freedom, from a ‘prior to every memory’, ‘an ulterior to every accomplishment’, 
from the non-present par excellence, the non-original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence. 
(1998, p. 10) 
The essence to which Levinas refers is ontological knowledge, or comprehension of beings in terms 
of generalisation, identity and universality of concepts. Ontological thinking, or thinking about 
beings, leaves all irreducibility and singularity outside of the relation established by the thinking 
subject towards the objects of knowledge: “The work of ontology consists in apprehending the 
individual not in its individuality but in its generality” (Levinas, 1969, p. 44). According to Levinas, 
ontology is a philosophy of power, based on the impersonal universality of concepts that turn 
difference and singularity into sameness. Ontological thinking is in other words a form of impersonal 
knowledge that predominates over the relation with the concrete other in its singularity, in order for 
the thinking subject to“comprehend orgrasp it”(Levinas, 1969, p. 46). Although ontological thinking 
predominates in the tradition of Western philosophy, Levinas finds in the ethical relation with the 
other an originary form of thinking that ‘overflows the capacity of thought’ (1969, p. 49), adopting 
the idea of infinity that Descartes (1993) described in the Third Meditation. The argument of that 
meditation, aimed at establishing the existence of god by the fact that the idea of the infinite cannot 
have been generated by a finite being, is turned by Levinas to designate the encounter with the 
other in the form of irreducible alterity,“the relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority 
to him who thinks it” (1969, p. 50). Following this relation of exteriority in the ethical encounter, the 
other eludes the self and interrupts the dialectic process of representation, when the other is 
enveloped into a theme and identity is reaffirmed through the creation of a totality. This passage 
from the solitude of the thinking self to the sociality that is established with the other encountered 
in her/his singularity is constituted through language, from the dimension of the said to that of the 
saying. The two modalities of the saying and the said are explored in Otherwise than Being (Levinas, 
1998) in relation to language and temporality, when phenomena emerge in consciousness from the 
flow of perceptions. Levinas describes experience unfolding in two temporalities, the diachronic and 
the synchronic. In this latter form of temporality, consciousness organises experience in a coherent 
flow of past, present and future, and the impressions given to consciousness from the external world 
are categorised and identified with the use of language. This activity of categorisation, that Levinas 
defines as thematisation, proceeds from a proclamatory, or kerygmatic, expression: which is to say 
that to identify a being -to acknowledge a being- is to pronounce a proclamation, the fact that a 
phenomenon is “this as that” (Levinas, 1998, p. 35). With this activity, experience is shaped and 
organised into categories that belong to the doxa (i.e. the historical and cultural horizon in which the 
self is situated). This cultural horizon is the said: 
Giving to historical languages spoken by people a locus, enabling them to orient or polarise the 
diversity of the thematised as they choose. (1998, p. 36) 
This means that kerygmatic proclamations organise immediate experience into intelligible 
phenomena that are consequently transmitted in the form of narration in the context of cultural 
traditions, what Levinas calls the “thematised” (Peperzak, 1989). The other dimension of language, 
the saying, operates beyond the language of identification and categorisation. In this dimension, 
diachrony is an event that interrupts the synchronicity of time, the orderly flow of past, present and 
future, through the encounter with the singularity- or uniqueness- of the other person. This relation 
between temporality, being and language in the saying and the said is explicated by Levinas in the 
ambiguity of being thought at the same time as a verb, to be, and the noun indicating a simple being 
or the totality of beings. When being is expressed as noun, it means that the object of experience is 
isolated from the flow of time and is fixed in synchronic temporality by consciousness into a theme, 
concept, category, through the said. However, the presence of verbs in language reveals temporality 
in terms of process, becoming, event in the saying. Rather than placing the two modes of language 
into a dialectic opposing relation, requiring a synthesis and a totality in which the two elements 
would rest, Levinas describes the saying in terms of resonance, a diachronic temporality that allows 
a phenomenon to appear to consciousness before it is absorbed by the said. In other words, the two 
elements complement each other, as the saying needs a said in order to be processed by 
consciousness, but it dwells in the said as an irreducible remainder of difference between the 
content expressed in the said and what escapes categorisation: 
It is only in the said that, in the epos of saying, the diachrony of time is synchronised into a time that 
is recallable, and becomes a theme. (…) But the signification of saying goes beyond the said. 
(Levinas, 1998, p. 37) 
Here, I understand that the presence of the saying underlying the said challenges the idea of the 
transparency of language, or the perfect correspondence between word and meaning. Levinas 
employs this understanding of language to illustrate two modalities of existence, the ontological 
relation to being expressed in the said, in which meaning is fixed, and the ethical relation to the 
other that emerges in the saying. The ethical relation is also referred in terms of non-relation, to 
emphasise the irreducibility of the other to the categories of the self, which brings about the loss of 
the “Cartesian privilege” of consciousness (Levinas, 1996, p. 60). In other words, when the other is 
encountered in this modality, the saying is expressed in the form of the uncertainty of open-ended 
dialogue. In the next section, I will contextualise the two categories of the saying and the said in the 
field of intercultural research. I contrast the ethical relation described by Levinas to the notion of 
autonomy that guides the formulation of competence and intercultural responsibility, in other words 
the formulation of the self in terms of the Cartesian “I think” and characterised by autonomy and 
self-sufficiency. With this contrast, I bring forward on the one side the notion of responsibility in 
terms of open-ended dialogue and critical engagement (the saying), and on the other a conception 
of responsibility understood as tolerance of the other (the said). 
The saying and the said: two scenarios of responsibility  
To summarise, the said fixes and establishes meanings, it categorises, enveloping an object of 
knowledge into a theme, it is speaking about something and not to someone. Language as 
information, the said, expresses the symmetry of self and other in the form of communication of 
content. In this dimension of the said, after being reduced to the known categories of sameness by 
the active synthesis of the knowing subject, the other becomes the recipient of the moral action in 
the form of responsibility, tolerance, sensitivity to cultural difference. On the other hand, the saying 
is a ‘speaking to’ in the form of dialogue, when the self does not occupy a central position bestowing 
meaning on the other. The saying is proximity, commitment of the one for the other (Levinas, 1985). 
Levinas describes this proximity in terms of vulnerability of the subject destitute of sovereignty as an 
autonomous, self-sufficient being, and exposed to the other. This encounter with alterity is the 
unveiling of a physical vulnerability ‘from which we cannot slip away’ (Butler, 2005, p. 101), 
grounding our responsibility as ethical beings in presence to the other (Levinas in Robbins, 2001). 
Levinas (1998) further qualifies this approaching as the uncovering of the one who speaks, a 
denuding of identity in front of the other, an entering of the diachronic temporalisation that is not 
actively synthesised by the knowing subject but lived in the experience of exposure as responsibility 
for the other. Thus, the said and the saying stand for two conceptions of speech: the former 
represents the transmission of content, or communicative competence; the latter is manifested in 
the presence of speakers to one another, the response to the singularity of the other when the self 
is addressed in speech (Blanchot, 1993). I suggest that the notion of language as information 
needing communicative competence to ensure effective transmission of content, which is prevalent 
in the notion of intercultural training, is a form of totalisation of meaning (Derrida, 1988), the fact 
that the intention of the speaking subject is in this way exhausted in the speech act, thus leaving no 
residue that escapes the transmission of intentional meaning. This totalisation is apparent in the 
idea of intercultural training, by which the competences required to interpret communicative 
behaviour as expression of a particular culture and to react with an appropriate response in order to 
communicate effectively are provided. Such an instrumental understanding of communication is 
radically challenged by the saying, the relation established in speaking to one another, maintaining 
an asymmetry that defers the process of consensus and closure of meaning into the totality of being. 
In this way, using this distinction between the saying and the said, the ethical dimension of 
intercultural communication emerges as the open-ended character of dialogue, which is 
foregrounded over the idea of communicative competence as effective transmission of meaning. 
This main contrast between the two modes of communication of the saying and the said is further 
illustrated in the way in which they are defined by Levinas in the context of the relation between the 
self and the other. Whilst in the notion of intercultural competence the self and the other are beings 
enclosed within their own cultural horizon awaiting reciprocal recognition, in the saying self and 
other are inter-dependent because dialogue requires interaction between interlocutors, and the 
passage from the synchronicity of themes and categories to the diachrony of lived time. Thus, ethical 
responsibility resides in this relation between self and other established in the saying, which Levinas 
describes as a ‘face-to-face’ encounter: on the one hand, in the said, the other is reified into a 
cultural being, on the other hand in dialogue, the other is encountered in their own singularity, 
uniqueness. As such, the two categories of the saying and the said suggest two scenarios of 
intercultural interaction that show two different approaches to responsibility, one operating in the 
dimension of the said and the other in the dimension of the saying. 
In the first instance, in the dimension of the said, communication develops on a set of assumptions 
regarding cultural belonging and identity. In this context, the notion of ethical responsibility is 
limited to the effortto understand the other as a cultural being and to avoid misunderstanding. In 
this case, the other is an object of knowledge, not an interlocutor, and responsibility is understood 
as tolerance of the other by the sovereign subject, the autonomous rational agent of Kantian 
tradition. In the second instance, in the dimension of the saying, dialogue unfolds in ways that are 
unpredictable and that can question our assumptions about culture, identity and belonging through 
reciprocal interaction between others. Thus, responsibility is revealed not as a conscious act from a 
fully bounded, all knowing subject, but as finding oneself in a situation that is not of our making. In 
this regard, Levinas describes the situation of the self being singled out in his/her uniqueness by the 
call of the other as the ‘originary place of identification’ (cited in Robbins, 2001, p. 110), in contrast 
to being identified according to a principle of individuation based on the fact of belonging to a 
particular national or cultural group. According to Levinas, the status of the saying and the said in 
relation to alterity – or otherness – surfaces in its simplest forms in everyday acts of politeness, for 
instance in the act of being addressed by an other, when the saying resonates briefly in the presence 
of two interlocutors: 
In discourse I have always distinguished, in fact, between the saying and the said. That the saying 
must bear a said is a necessity of the same order as that which imposes a society with laws, 
institutions and social relations. But the saying is the fact that before the face I do not simply remain 
there contemplating it, I respond to it. The saying is a way of greeting the Other, but to greet the 
Other is already to answer for him. It is difficult to be silent in someone’s presence; this difficulty has 
its ultimate foundation in this signification proper to the saying, whatever is the said. It is necessary 
to speak of something, of the rain and fine weather, no matter what, but to speak, to respond to him 
and already to answer for him. (1985, p. 88) 
Adopting a Levinasian perspective, the ethical aspect of language emerges when the discourse of 
effectiveness, reliability and performance is superseded by concern for the other qua other. 
Conclusion  
Intercultural Responsibility: Saying or Said? A problematic aspect in the formulation of competence 
in intercultural communication is represented by the emphasis placed on the consciousness of the 
intercultural speaker, which focuses on the cultural divide between self and other. Communication is 
examined in reference to awareness of cultural differences and with the use of neutral, scientific 
vocabulary, expressed in the language employed in intercultural training such as competence, skills, 
training and effectiveness (e.g. Deardorff, 2006, 2009; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004; Spencer-Oatey & 
Stadler, 2009). This emphasis on consciousness and on a functional, instrumental understanding of 
communication influences the ways in which ethical responsibility is understood in intercultural 
research (e.g. Guilherme et al., 2010). To this end, a challenging prospect for future research is 
represented by the development of forms of theoretical approaches that bring forward and engage 
with the partial, contested and situated nature of language. Ultimately, the dynamics underpinning 
communication cannot be readily translated into a formula with practical applications measured by 
the reliable testing of competences. Despite current articulations of the critical intercultural speaker 
(Byram, Guilherme) and the languaging subject (Phipps, Gonzalez) which are increasingly attentive 
towards the hybrid and shifting nature of the self and the socially constructed nature of language, 
more theoretical engagement is needed to challenge the reliance on the functionalist paradigm of 
communication described in Martin and Nakayama (2010), that characterises models of 
communicative competence and responsibility. However, as Phipps argues (2013), the problematic 
divide between theoretical explorations of ethical issues on the one side, and empirical research 
driven by the collection of data according to established methodologies in social research on the 
other, raises questions that need addressing in the field of intercultural research, particularly in 
relation to the role of the researcher in eliciting, collecting and analysing data. This ethical issue 
brings to light another under-theorised aspect of intercultural communication, namely the aporia of 
praxis between relativism and a politics of presence (MacDonald & O’Regan, 2012). In other words, 
critical intercultural theory embraces and celebrates cultural difference whilst also aiming at 
unearthing essentialised truths behind perceived ideological falsifications and hegemonic 
interpretations. Intercultural discourse thus finds itself posited amidst competing validity claims, 
each asserting their own truth, but incapable of deciding between them. Instead, in the name of 
universalised ethics of tolerance, it is obliged to support them all. As a result, the vision of ethics 
promoted in critical interculturalism relies on the idea that intercultural communication will create a 
fusion of cultural horizons through the idea of universal tolerance, although critical interculturalists 
have to face other competing claims, for instance those emanating from visions of cultural purity 
which reassert nationalistic values and divisive arguments across ethnic, linguistic, cultural and 
historical lines. As a tentative approach, this reading of Levinas suggests that although we are 
culturally situated, and our cultural horizon is the first instrument that we use in interpreting the 
world, the ethical encounter opens up a dialogic dimension of communication that is also critical 
engagement and concern for the concrete other, rather than simple tolerance towards an abstract 
‘cultural other’. According to this notion of ethical commitment, human individuals cannot be 
reduced to members or organs of any given community, in the sense that cultural categorisation and 
the notion of ‘fixing’ communication reduce the ethical force of the encounter with the other. To 
conclude, I suggest that there are a number of factors that need to be accounted for in order to 
develop an ethical model of intercultural communication that challenges preconceived ideas of the 
other and of culture. First of all, an appreciation of the interdependence of self and other and an 
awareness of the complexity of real life in which interactions take place, including ideological 
constructions of culture and the discursive practices that surround the perception of the other 
(Dervin, 2011; Holliday, 2011; Kramsch, 2009). Furthermore, a consideration of the power 
dimensions at play in communication, particularly socio-economic inequality and sociolinguistic 
competence in the use of a dominant language in intercultural encounters (Blommaert, 1998; Piller, 
2011; Scollon & Scollon, 1995). Finally, an acceptance of uncertainty in the form of responsible 
engagement with others in dialogue, through the awareness of the position of the self as potential 
all-knowing subject that silences the other and ignores the “needs, beliefs, feelings, desires, 
interests, demands, or injustices faced by interlocutors in any event” (Smith, 1997, p. 330). In this 
last sense, responsible engagement in dialogue demands that the Cartesian presuppositions that 
underlie IC theory are acknowledged and critiqued by interculturalists. Perhaps, an ethical approach 
to IC entails taking the risk of meeting the other qua other, without the safety net of cultural 
categorisation, and at the same time being aware that the encounter with the other does not occur 
in a vacuum, because we are always positioned within networks of power. 
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